Sovereign credit ratings and financial markets linkages: application to European data by Afonso, A. et al.
 Sovereign credit ratings and financial markets 
linkages: application to European data 
 
António Afonso $ # , Davide Furceri & % and Pedro Gomes + 
 
 
$
 ISEG/UTL - Technical University of Lisbon, Department of Economics; UECE – Research Unit on 
Complexity and Economics. UECE is supported by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal), 
email: aafonso@iseg.utl.pt. 
 
#
 European Central Bank, Directorate General Economics, Fiscal Policies Division, Kaiserstraße 29, D-60311 
Frankfurt am Main, Germany. email: antonio.afonso@ecb.europa.eu. 
 
& International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street NW, 20431 Washington DC, USA. Email: dfurceri@imf.org. 
[corresponding author] 
 
% University of Palermo. Viale delle Scienze, 90128,Palermo, Italy. Email : furceri@economia.unipa.it. 
 
+
 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Department of Economics, c/ Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, Spain. email: 
pgomes@eco.uc3m.es. 
 
Abstract 
 
We use EU sovereign bond yield and CDS spreads daily data to carry out an event study 
analysis on the reaction of government yield spreads before and after announcements from 
rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch). Our results show significant 
responses of government bond yield spreads to changes in rating notations and outlook, 
particularly in the case of negative announcements. Announcements are not anticipated at 
1-2 months horizon but there is bi-directional causality between ratings and spreads within 
1-2 weeks; spillover effects especially among EMU countries and from lower rated 
countries to higher rated countries; and persistence effects for recently downgraded 
countries.  
 
Highlights 
 
► Event study analysis of the reaction of government yield spreads to rating 
announcements. ► We find significant responses of yield spreads particularly for negative 
announcements. ► The reaction of CDS spreads to negative announcements increased 
after the Lehman bankruptcy. ► There is evidence of rating announcement spillovers from 
lower to higher rated countries. ► Countries downgraded less than six months ago face 
higher spreads than countries with similar rating not downgraded. 
 
JEL: C23; E44; G15. 
Keywords: credit ratings; sovereign yields; rating agencies. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
After the 2008-2009 financial and economic crisis sovereign bond yield spreads 
increased markedly in several European Union (EU) countries, notably in the euro area, 
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and above what one would expect from the sum of inflation, real economic growth, and 
fiscal developments. The main cause of such developments has to be found in the 
increased awareness of capital markets towards the different macro and fiscal 
fundamentals of each country, notably the increase in fiscal imbalances in the aftermath of 
the crisis. Not surprisingly, several downgrades also occurred at the sovereign rating level, 
both impinging and reinforcing the upward movements in sovereign spreads.  
Given that government debt crises have been less common in developed countries 
(Reinhart, 2010), previous work in the literature has focused on the relation between rating 
and yield and Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads for emerging and developing economies. 
However, little work exists regarding the response of yields (CDS) spreads to rating 
announcements for a large group of advanced economies. 
This paper tries to fill this gap. We carry out an event study analysis to examine the 
effects of sovereign credit rating announcements of upgrades and downgrades (as well as 
changes in rating outlooks) on sovereign bond yield (CDS) spreads in EU countries. We 
use daily data from January 1995 until October 2010.  
Our contribution is twofold. First, we conduct an event study analysis looking at the 
reaction of yield spreads (and CDS spreads) within two days of the announcements from 
the rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. We make a distinction 
between the three main rating agencies to assess whether some agencies have bigger or 
more lagged impacts on the sovereign bond markets. We also look whether spread 
developments anticipate, to some extent, rating movements. 
Second, with the ratings converted into a numerical scale, we run a causality test 
between the transformed ratings and the yield (CDS) spreads. We look at whether 
sovereign yields and CDS spreads in a given country react to rating announcements of 
other countries, and whether there are asymmetries in the transmission of these spillover 
effects. In addition, we also examine whether downgrades and upgrades carry more 
information to the market, beyond the information contained in the rating notation. 
According to our analysis, the main findings include: i) a significant response of 
government bond yield spreads to changes in both the rating notations and the rating 
outlook, particularly important for the case of negative announcements; ii) rating 
announcements are essentially not anticipated in the previous 1 or 2 months but; iii) there 
is bi-directional causality between ratings and spreads in a 1-2 week window; iv) there is 
evidence of contagion, specially from lower rated countries to higher rated countries; and 
v) countries that have been downgraded less than six months ago face higher spreads than 
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countries with the same rating but that have not been downgraded within the last six 
months. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly reviews the 
related literature. Section three describes the data and some stylised facts. Section four 
conducts the empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section five concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
There are several papers analysing the behaviour of credit rating agencies (see, for 
instance, the survey by de Haan and Amtenbrink, 2011). More specifically, the existing 
studies dealing with sovereign debt ratings can be broadly grouped into two areas. First, we 
find papers that try to uncover the determinants of sovereign debt rating notations, notably 
via the estimation of both linear estimation methods and ordered response models (see, for 
instance, Afonso, 2003; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005 and Afonso, Gomes and Rother, 
2011, for both developed and developing countries). These studies conclude that the rating 
scale is mainly explained by the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, external debt, 
the public debt level and the government budget balance. Some other papers document 
other predictors of rating migrations such as:  the outlook status, past rating changes, the 
rating duration or the existing rating (see Al-Sakka and Gwilym, 2009 and Hill, Brooks 
and Faff, 2010). 
Second, there are studies that address the explanatory power of sovereign ratings for 
the development of government bond spreads, which is closer to the event study analysis 
that we undertake here. For instance, Afonso and Strauch (2007) evaluate to which extent 
policy events taking place in the course of 2002, when the Stability and Growth Pact was 
put to a test, impinged on sovereign spreads. They find some mitigated effects of policy 
events on the euro interest rate swap spreads, the difference between the 10-year rate for 
the inter-bank swap market, and the 10-year government bond yield. 
Kräussl (2005) conducts an event study analysis using daily sovereign ratings of long-
term foreign currency debt from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. For the period under 
analysis, 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2000, they construct a so-called index of 
speculative market pressure to determine the ratings effect on financial markets. They 
report that sovereign rating changes and credit outlooks have a relevant effect on the size 
and volatility of lending in emerging markets, notably for the case of ratings’ downgrades 
and negative outlooks. 
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Using also an event study for the period 1989–1997, with sovereign credit rating data 
from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) find a 
significant rating effect on the government bond yield spread when a country was put on 
review for a downgrade. They also report the existence of two-way causality between 
sovereign credit ratings and government bond yield spreads for the set of 29 emerging 
markets in their study. 
Ismailescu and Hossein (2010) assess the effect of sovereign credit rating 
announcements on sovereign CDS spreads, and their possible spillover effects.  According 
to their results, for daily observations from January 2, 2001 to April 22, 2009 for 22 
emerging markets, positive events have a greater impact on CDS markets in the two-day 
period surrounding the event, being then more likely to spill over to other countries. 
Moreover, a positive credit rating event is more relevant for emerging markets. On the 
other hand, markets tend to anticipate negative events.  
Gande and Parsley (2005) report that the existence of spillover effects across sovereign 
ratings, in a study for the period 1991-2000, for a set of 34 developed and developing 
economies. This implies that contagion effects are present when a rating event occurs and 
are, therefore, worthwhile being assessed as well. In addition, Arezki, Candelon and Sy 
(2011), studying the European financial markets during the period 2007-2010, also find 
evidence of contagion, of sovereign downgrades of countries near speculative grade, on 
other euro area countries. 
 
3. Data and stylized facts 
3.1. Sovereign ratings 
A rating notation is an assessment of the issuer’s ability to pay back in the future both 
capital and interests. The three main rating agencies use similar rating scales, with the best 
quality issuers receiving a triple-A notation. 
 Our data for the credit rating developments are from the three main credit rating 
agencies: Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s (M) and Fitch (F). We transform the 
sovereign credit rating information into a discrete variable that codifies the decision of the 
rating agencies as depicted in Table 1. In practice, we use a linear scale to group the ratings 
in 17 categories, where the triple-A is attributed the level 17, and where we put together in 
the same bucket the few observations below B-, which all receive a level of one in the 
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scale.1 Usually, notations at and below BB+ and Ba1 tend to be seen as relating to 
speculative grade debt. 
[Table 1] 
 
 On a given date, the dummy variables upM and downM, as an example for Moody’s, 
assume the following values: 
         
1,  if an upgrade occurs
0, otherwiseit
upM = 

.
1,  if a downgrade occurs
0, otherwiseit
downM = 

.
              (1.1) 
 A similar set of discrete variables were constructed for S&P and for Fitch. 
Alternatively, to the credit rating announcements, we also consider the changes in the 
rating outlooks and we construct analogous discrete variables 
 
1,  a positive outlook occurs
0, otherwiseit
posM

= 

, 
1,  a negative outlook occurs
0, otherwiseit
negM

= 

 (1.2) 
 Given that changes in the outlook tend to anticipate movements in the rating notation, 
the information content of the outlook is in itself valuable for explaining the movements of 
the yield spreads. 
 
3.2. Data set 
In the analysis, we cover twenty-four EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom. No data were available for Cyprus, Estonia and 
Luxembourg. 
The daily dataset starts as early as 2 January 1995 for some countries and ends on 10 
October 2010.2 The data for the sovereign rating announcements and rating outlook 
changes were provided by the three rating agencies: Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and 
Fitch. It covers between 96000 and 99000 observations.  
The data for the sovereign bond yields, which is for the 10-year government bond, end-
of-day data, comes from Reuters (68376 observations).The data for the CDS spreads is for 
                                                          
1
 For instance, Reisen and Maltzan (1999) apply a logistic transformation and Afonso (2003) applies both a 
logistic and an exponential transformation, but Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2011) confirm that such 
tranformations provide little improvement over the linear one, therefore, not finding evidence of so-called 
“cliff effects” (when investors shift portfolio composition to encompass only investment grade paper). 
2
 This covers the period of the euro debt crisis, when some sovereign bond markets were distorted or not 
functioning, and were also helped via the ECB’s Securities Market Programme.  
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5-year senior debt, and comes from DataStream (historical close - Euro). Regarding the 
CDS spreads daily dataset, in some cases it starts as early as 1 January 2003, implying the 
availability of a maximum of 36713 observations. Additionally, we also use an equity 
index, as reported in Datastream, which starts as early as of 1 January 2002 (57272 
observations).3 
 
3.3. Stylised facts 
In total, since 1995, there were 394 rating announcements from the three agencies.  
S&P and Fitch were the most active agencies with 150 and 138 announcements, whereas 
Moody’s only had 108. Out of these announcements, mostly of them were upgrades (167) 
and positive outlook announcements (88) rather than downgrades and negative outlooks 
(79 and 60, respectively).4 
However, and because we only have data on sovereign yields and CDS spreads starting 
at a later period, we cannot use the full set of rating announcements. Therefore, in our 
study we have 191 announcements overlapping with sovereign yield data, 167 overlapping 
with CDS spreads data and 252 overlapping with stock market returns. 
The sovereign yield data are not fully available or are less reliable for several eastern 
European countries, namely Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia or Slovenia. On the other 
hand, with CDS data there is a lower weight of rating announcements in the Euro Area and 
a bigger weight of the other EU27 countries (excluding Cyprus, Estonia and 
Luxembourg.).  
Table 2 shows the average sovereign yield spread over Germany and the average CDS 
spread for the different rating notations. We can see that, on average, AAA countries have 
a spread of 0.2 percentage points over German 10 year bonds. As the rating deteriorates, 
the spread goes up. The countries rated AA- and A+ pay 1 percentage point more than 
Germany to issue sovereign debt. For the A-rating, the spread is around 2 percentage 
points. Closer to “junk” grade, spreads are between three and five percentage points. 
[Table 2] 
 
Figures 1 and 2 depict respectively the sovereign yield spread and the CDS spread, ten 
days before and up to ten days after the rating announcements. This simple illustrative 
exercise shows that sovereign yields tend to accompany more downgrade announcements, 
                                                          
3 The respective country indices are described in the Data Annex. 
4 A full summary of rating announcements is provided in Appendix 1. We also report, per country, the data 
for the sovereign yield, CDS spreads and rating developments.  
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and the magnitude of the changes in the spreads is higher in those cases. Regarding CDS 
spreads, there seems to be some downward movement before rating upgrades, while in the 
case of outlook announcements this is less anticipated.   
[Figure 1] 
[Figure 2] 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 This section studies the relation between rating announcements and sovereign yield and 
CDS spreads along several main dimensions:  
 i) analyzes the reaction of rating announcements on yields and CDS spreads, and looks 
notably at whether: a) the effect is anticipated, b) the effect is different between the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and non-EMU countries, c) the reaction of yields 
and CDS markets has increased after the onset of the 2008 financial crisis;  
 ii) assesses whether sovereign ratings lead or cause changes in the yields and CDS 
spreads beyond and above other observable yields determinants;  
 iii) gauges whether sovereign yields and CDS spreads in a given country react to rating 
announcements of other countries, and whether there are asymmetries in the transmission 
of these spillover effects; 
iv) examines whether downgrades and upgrades carry more information to the market, 
beyond the information contained in the rating notation. 
 
4.1. Event study 
 To analyze how sovereign yields (and CDS) spreads respond to sovereign credit ratings 
and to credit outlook announcements we apply a standard event study methodology. In 
particular, we measure the response of the yield and CDS spreads over a two-day period (-
1, 1), where the rating event is considered to occur at time zero. The use of a narrow 
window of two days, compared to, say, ten or thirty days, allows reducing contamination 
problems, which may bias the results of the analysis. 
 The standard event study approach usually links rating events to abnormal differences 
between model generated and actual movements in the yields (and CDS). Since the model-
generated movements should be computed for the periods where no rating event takes 
place, and not enough observations are available for this purpose, we have to base the 
event study on the observed bond yields (and CDS) spreads between country specific 
bonds and German bonds (see Campbell et al., 1997 for a detailed discussion). In addition, 
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given that sovereign spreads are generally highly correlated across countries (Longstaff et 
al. 2011), we attempt to control for changes in the EU market conditions by computing an 
adjusted measure of sovereign yields (and CDS) spreads. Such measure is the difference 
between the sovereign's yield (and CDS) spread and the country average of the spreads 
(implying an equally weighted portfolio created of all the EU countries in the sample, de-
meaning the country spread). 
 Table 3 reports the average change between t-1 and t+1 in the adjusted measure of 
sovereign yields (in decimal points) spreads and CDS (in basis points) spreads during the 
occurrence of a rating event at time t. A positive (negative) rating event for a given agency 
takes place when there is an upgrade (downgrade) of the credit rating or an upward 
(downward) revision in the sovereign’s credit outlook. The results in the table show that 
while there is a significant reaction of sovereign yield spreads and particularly CDS 
spreads to negative events, the reaction to positive events is much more muted.  
 This result is consistent with previous studies in the literature, which generally 
conclude that only negative credit rating announcements have significant impacts on yields 
and CDS spreads (Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; Norden and Weber, 2004; Hull et al. 
2004; Kraussl, 2005). Interestingly, there are studies suggesting that responses to positive 
and negative information are asymmetric, and that negative news have a much greater 
impact on individuals’ attitudes than do positive news. Put in another way, agents care 
more strongly about utility losses than they do about gains of equal magnitudes (see, for 
instance, Bowman et al., 1999, and Soroka, 2006). 
[Table 3] 
 
 Considering all announcements among the different rating agencies, the results suggest 
that while a negative event increases the yields (CDS) sovereign spreads by 0.08 (0.13 
percentage points), a positive event reduces the CDS sovereign spreads by around 0.01 
percentage points. The magnitude of the effect of a negative event is considerable given 
that the average response of both yields and CDS spreads over a two-day window in 
absolute value is around 0.04 percentage points. The results are also robust when we 
exclude, for a given event over a 30 days window, lagged announcements from other 
agencies. Analyzing the market’s reaction to announcements of different agencies, the 
results in the table suggest that while sovereign yields spreads react significantly only to 
negative S&P’s announcements (and marginally to positive announcements from 
Moody’s), sovereign CDS spreads increase in the presence of negative Moody’s and 
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Fitch’s announcements, and decrease when positive S&P announcements occur. This 
difference in the response is likely to be due to differences in the timing of the 
announcements across the agencies, with S&P’s downgrades announcements in the 
majority of the cases preceding Fitch’s and Moody’s downgrades.5 Finally, while the 
reaction in the sovereign yields spreads seems to take place mostly during the second day 
of the two-day period, the reaction in the CDS spreads mostly occurs during the first day. 
 We repeat the event study analysis by disaggregating negative (positive) events 
between periods of rating downgrades (upgrades) and periods of negative (positive) 
outlook revisions. The results reported in Table 4 suggest that for negative events both 
sovereign yields and CDS spreads respond very similarly to rating downgrades and 
negative outlook revisions. In contrast, among positive rating events, the results suggest 
that sovereign CDS spreads are more responsive to positive outlook revisions than the 
yield spreads.  
[Table 4] 
 
 We have also tested whether the effect of rating announcements on sovereign yields 
and CDS spreads is different between EMU and non-EMU countries.6 To this purpose we 
repeated the event study analysis for both EMU and non-EMU countries, re-calculating for 
each group the adjusted measure of sovereign yield and CDS spreads by using the equally 
weighted portfolio yield spreads and CDS spreads in each of the two samples. 
 Table 5 reports the results for the overall sample and the two country groups. While 
one could expect, a priori, that given the recent sovereign debt pressure faced by EMU 
countries, the reaction of both sovereign yields and CDS spreads to ratings announcements 
would be larger in EMU countries, when looking at the table  we can observe that the 
response is qualitatively similar between EMU and non-EMU countries. In particular, and 
considering all rating announcements from the three rating agencies, while a negative 
event increases yields (CDS) spreads by 0.09 (0.11) percent in EMU countries, the increase 
in yields (CDS) spreads in non-EMU countries is about 0.08 (0.13) percent.  A possible 
explanation of this similarity in the response is that during our period of analysis several 
                                                          
5
 Looking at downgrades across  agencies over a window of 30 days it appears that, for the same event, 
S&P’s  announcements precede Fitch’s announcements, which are followed by Moody’s downgrades. This 
observation, however, has to be qualified by the fact that is not always possible to distinguish between 
different but contiguous downgrades events. 
6
 In our sample, we have 14 EMU countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, the number of non-EMU countries being 
ten. 
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downgrades for non-EMU countries have occurred in periods when these countries have 
faced marked financial and sovereign fragility. 
 Sovereign yields respond weakly (and negatively) to positive events in EMU countries 
but this is not the case in non-EMU countries. Overall, the difference in the results is never 
statistically significant. For the case of the non-EMU countries, when positive rating events 
take place, the CDS spreads only react to S&P announcements.  
[Table 5] 
 
The results presented so far drawing on a standard event study analysis, may suffer 
from a specification problem and therefore they may be biased. Indeed, the event study 
approach, based on the test of the means fails to account for the pattern of bond yields 
(CDS) spreads that might bias the estimated reaction of bond yields (CDS) spreads to 
current rating changes. To correct for this problem, we assess how sovereign yields (and 
CDS) spreads respond to sovereign credit ratings and to credit outlook announcements  by 
estimating a country fixed effect panel regression of (adjusted measures) of sovereign 
yields (and CDS) spreads on rating dummies (D): 
 
 1it i it it itS S Dα ρ β ε−= + + + , (2) 
where S refers to the adjusted measures of sovereign yields (and CDS), αi are country fixed 
effects and D is a dummy that takes value equal to 1 when the credit rating (or outlook) 
changes (as explained in (1.1) and (1.2)). This method has also the advantage of 
quantifying the impact of ratings announcements on sovereign bond yields and CDS 
spreads compared to their normal movement in the time series. 
The estimations results reported in Table 6 are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 4, and confirm the finding that mostly negative credit rating announcements have 
significant positive impacts on yields and CDS spreads. For instance, considering all 
announcements from the different rating agencies, the results show that a negative rating 
event increases the yields (CDS) sovereign spreads by 0.08 (0.05 percentage points).7 On 
the other hand, positive rating announcements of S&P and Moody’s reduce CDS spreads. 
[Table 6] 
 
                                                          
7
 In this context, it usually argued that the CDS market is more liquid that the bond market, therefore, the 
former would incorporate a lower liquidity premium (see, for instance, Zhu, 2006). 
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Finally, we test whether the effect of rating announcements has changed over time. In 
this case, we are interested in analyzing whether the reaction of sovereign markets to rating 
announcements has become stronger during the recent period of financial turbulence. To 
this purpose, we re-estimate equation (2) after and before the 15th of September of 2008 
(the day in which Lemhan Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection).  
One should be careful in interpreting this exercise because of the sample composition. 
For instance, while there are 111 positive events for the yield spreads before the 
bankruptcy of Lemhan Brothers (56 for CDS spreads), there are only four positive events 
afterwards (six for CDS). With respect to negative events, the difference is not as dramatic, 
with 33 events before that date for yields (22 for CDS) and 68 after (77 for CDS). 
The results reported in Table 7 suggest that while the reaction of sovereign yields 
spreads has remained broadly unchanged, the reaction of CDS spreads to negative rating 
events has increased considerably after the beginning of the crisis.  
[Table 7] 
 
The difference in reaction between sovereign yields and CDS to rating announcements 
is consistent with the fact that financial sovereign markets have become particularly 
exposed to “bad” news, and that CDS have significantly increased more than yields after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Indeed, while average sovereign yields spreads have 
increased by 81 basis points (from 66 to 147 basis points), average sovereign CDS spreads 
have raised by 127 basis points (from 18 to 145 basis points). The difference between  
the yield and CDS spreads might also be related to the fear of collapse of  
AIG, given than it was a very large institution in the CDS market, where it held  
a very asymmetric position.  
 
4.2. Testing anticipation 
 The results presented so far have shown that both sovereign yields and CDS spreads 
mostly react to (negative) rating announcements. The question that arises is whether both 
sovereign yields and CDS have already absorbed the information contained in changes in 
the ratings well before their announcements. To test for this hypothesis we re-estimate 
equation (2) considering the adjusted measure of sovereign yields (and CDS) spreads over 
two different 30 and 60 days windows: [-30,-1] and [-60,-1]. To avoid contamination, 
rating events that were preceded by other events in the same country in the previous 30 
days (for the period [-30,-1]), or 60 days (for the period [-60,-1]) are eliminated.  
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Table 8 reports the estimates relative to S&P announcements (when Moody’s and 
Fitch’s announcements are analyzed the results are qualitatively unchanged).8 Looking at 
the table, it is evident that information contained in both downward and upward outlook 
revisions is not anticipated by sovereign yield and CDS markets. In contrast, while 
sovereign yield markets do not anticipate rating announcements, there is (weak) evidence 
that CDS markets seem to anticipate the information contained in rating downgrades. Such 
mostly lack of anticipation may also imply that in some cases rating events go for some 
reason astray of the underlying macro and fiscal fundamentals perceived by markets’ 
participants (on this issue see also Afonso and Gomes, 2011). 
[Table 8] 
 
The absence of statistical significance regarding the anticipation effects of positive 
announcements can be explained by two factors. First, our previous analysis has found 
strong empirical evidence that both sovereign yields and CDS spreads react mostly to 
negative announcements. Second, while there is a high incentive for governments to leak 
good news to rating agencies (Gande and Parsley, 2005), this incentive is null in the case 
of bad news.  
 
4.3. Causality 
 The results of the previous section suggest that the information contained in both 
downward and upward rating events is not anticipated well before (30-60 days) their 
announcements. At the same time, it could be still the case that over a shorter period (1-2 
weeks), past values of changes in the rating are significant determinants of changes in 
yields and CDS spreads. The same argument could be valid also for the inverse 
relationship. Indeed, while rating agencies do not always directly acknowledge the fact that 
a large movement in CDS prices (and, therefore, in the CDS implied rating) is an important 
factor in determining the timing and scope of rating actions, they are not immune to 
“pressure” coming from markets’ views on what the rating should be. 
 For further exploring the nexus of causality between rating changes and yield (or CDS) 
spreads over the short-term, we employ Granger causality tests in a panel framework. 
Therefore, in order to have a meaningful number of (non-zero) observations for changes in 
ratings we construct a measure of average rating across agencies (R) as:  
 
                                                          
8
 The results are available from the authours upon request. 
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(1/ 3)[( )
0.5( ) 0.5( )]
it it it it
it it it it it it
R SP F M
posSP posF posM negSP negF negM
= + + +
+ + + − + +
. (3) 
where SP, F, and M, take the values between 1 and 17 as explained in Table 1. 
 We perform causality tests by estimating separate regressions of the changes of spreads 
and ratings: 
 
0 1 2
1 1 1
k k k
i i i
it it i it i it i it
i i i
S S R Zγ γ γ ε
− − −
= = =
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑ ∑ , (4) 
 
0 1 2
1 1 1
k k k
i i i
it it i it i it i it
i i i
R S R Zλ λ λ ω
− − −
= = =
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑ ∑ , (5)  
 
0 1 2
1 1 1
k k k
i i i
it it i it i it i it
i i i
Z S R Zδ δ δ µ
− − −
= = =
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑ ∑ , (6) 
where Z is a vector of variables that influence sovereign yields (and CDS) spreads and the 
credit rating. Ideally, the vector Z should include all the determinants of sovereign yields 
and CDS spreads and rating changes. Previous results in the literature (for instance, Afonso 
et al. 2011) suggest considering as these determinants macroeconomic variables such as 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, domestic and foreign debt, public deficit, and financial 
variables. However, given that daily observations are only available for high frequency 
financial variables we restrict our vector Z to stock market returns (daily log returns of the 
equity indexes). Equations (4)-(6) are estimated both for the yield spreads and for the CDS 
spreads.9 
 Hence, we test if ratings cause the spreads, by regressing the daily change in spreads, 
on its own lags and lags of the daily change in rating, and test the joint significance of all 
coefficients of ratings. 10 Although we include lags of the dependent variable, we estimate 
each equation with country fixed effects. First, we have a very large number of time 
observations, so the bias should be close to zero. Furthermore, estimating the equation with 
GMM would imply that taking the differences of the differences of the variables, which 
would amplify the noise in the regression. To test the joint significance of the coefficients, 
we use the likelihood ratio test. 
[Table 9] 
  
                                                          
9
 Naturally, we are aware that it is difficult to distinguish between changes in fundamentals affecting both the 
spreads and the ratings at the same time at high frequency, and a joint effect cannot be completely discarded. 
10
 Given that the focus of the analysis is to explore the nexus of causality between rating changes and yields 
(or CDS) spreads over the short-term, the number of lags used in equations (4)–(6) has been alternatively 
restricted to 5 (corresponding to one week) and 10 (corresponding to two weeks). 
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 As in Reisen and von Maltzan (1999), we find two-way causality between sovereign 
credit ratings and government bond yield spreads (Table 9). Past values of changes in yield 
(CDS) spreads are significant determinants of the change in effective rating and vice-versa. 
We also reject the null that the stock market does not cause both the yield (CDS) spreads 
and the rating. On the other hand, in one set of regressions, we could not reject the null that 
the yield spreads and the rating do not cause the stock market returns. However, when we 
use the CDS spread, we do reject the null. Our estimates indicate that, while deriving 
information already available on the market, the ratings influence spreads beyond those 
fundamentals. In addition, all agencies respond to their competitors in terms of their rating 
actions, whether within one or two weeks, which suggests that there is no overall 
leadership by one agency (see Appendix 1 for the causality results per rating agency). 
 
4.4. Contagion  
The results of the previous section have provided strong empirical evidence that both 
sovereign yields and CDS spreads in a given country react to rating announcements 
concerning that country, and that bivariate causality exists. Another question that arises is 
whether sovereign yields spreads and CDS spreads in a given country also react to rating 
announcements for the other countries. In other words, we want to answer the question of 
whether spillover effects exist. 
To test for this hypothesis we regress the change of sovereign yields (CDS) 
spreads11 of a non-event country ( non eventitS −∆ ) on the average change in the rating in event 
countries: 
 
_________
non event event
it i it itS Rα β ε−∆ = + ∆ + , (7) 
where R is the average rating across agencies defined in the Granger causality section 
(equation (3)) and 
____
R∆
 is the average change of R across event countries. 
In addition, we test whether spillover effects depend on the difference in credit rating 
qualities between non-event and event countries (
______
non event event
it itR R
−
− ):12 
                                                          
11
 The analysis of the spillover effect is carried out using the sovereign yields (CDS) spreads change instead 
of the adjusted measure. The reason to do so is that the use of the adjusted measure will tend to understate 
spillover effects (Jorion and Zhand, 2007; Ismilescu and Kazemi, 2010). 
12
 It has to be recognized that equation (8) suffers from high collinearity between the interaction and the 
average change in the rating variables, which inflate the standard errors associated to the estimates. 
Alternatively it would be possible to estimate (8) excluding one of the non-interaction terms, however, this 
would lead to bias estimates and to a misleading interpretation of the results. 
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_________ ______ _________ ______
( ) ( )non event event non event event event non event eventit i it it it it it it itS R R R R R Rα β δ γ ε− − −∆ = + ∆ + − + ∆ − + . (8) 
Alternatively, we estimate equations (7) and (8) with: i) country fixed-effects; ii) 
country fixed effects and a time trend; iii) country fixed effects and time fixed effects. The 
results reported in Table 10 provide evidence of significant spillover effects for sovereign 
yields markets. In particular, from the results of the first column of each empirical 
approach, it is possible to observe that one (unconditional) increase in the average rating, 
R, in country-events decreases sovereign yields by 0.1 percent in non-event countries. In 
contrast, spillover effects are mostly not significant for sovereign CDS spreads. A possible 
explanation for this different statistical significance of the result between CDS and yields 
spread is that while local investors have long enjoyed participation in sovereign debt 
market, they have had relatively limited participation in sovereign CDS markets, which 
makes them less informative and reactive (Ranciere, 2002; Isamilescu and Kazemi, 2010).  
[Table 10] 
 
Our results also show that the spillover effects for the yield spreads are asymmetric and 
are a function of the difference in credit rating qualities. For instance, we find that rating 
announcements in event countries affect more significantly sovereign yields in non-event 
countries when the rating of the event country is lower than in non-event countries. In 
other words, non-event countries with a better credit rating will experience a significantly 
larger change in its sovereign yields spreads from spillover effects than a lower credit 
quality rating. This result is consistent with previous finding in the literature (Gande and 
Parsley, 2005; Isamilescu and Kazemi, 2010). Overall, these results suggest that given that 
differences in rating reflect, among other factors, differences in fiscal positions, we can 
also interpret this as evidence of some spillover effects from countries with weaker fiscal 
positions to countries with stronger fiscal positions. 
Finally, we test whether spillover effects are different between EMU and non-EMU 
countries. To this purpose, we re-estimated equation (7) for EMU and non-EMU countries 
separately. The results for the overall sample and the two country groups, reported in Table 
11, allow us to conclude that spillover effects are larger and statistically significant for 
EMU countries.  
[Table 11] 
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4.5. Persistence 
Some economists have argued that financial markets tend to react excessively to 
changes in sovereign ratings, particularly to downgrades. Although we cannot give a 
definite answer to this question, we can ask if markets respond to announcements of 
downgrades and upgrades themselves, somewhat beyond the information contained in the 
rating notation. We are able to shed light on this persistence issue, by estimating equation 
(9) 
 
2
1 1 1 3 1 3 3 6 3 6 6 12 6 12
1 1 1 3 1 3 3 6 3 6 6 12 6 12
it i it it
m m m m m m m m
it it it it
m m m m m m m m
it it it it
S R R
D D D D
U U U U
α β γ
δ δ δ δ
θ θ θ θ
< < < − < − < − < − < − < −
< < < − < − < − < − < − < −
= + + +
+ + + +
+ + +
, (9) 
were we regress the sovereign yield and CDS spreads on country dummies, on the average 
effective rating and its square. Additionally, we include a dummy if the country has been 
downgraded by any rating agency over the past month ( 1mitD< ), between the last 1 and 3 
months ( 1 3mitD< − ), between the last 3 and 6 months ( 3 6mitD< − ) and between the last 6 and 12 
months ( 6 12mitD< − ). We also include analogous dummies for the rating upgrades. 
Given that we are controlling for the level of rating, the interpretation of the 
coefficients on the dummies becomes quite interesting. If a country has been downgraded 
less than a month ago, it has a higher yield by 1mδ <  compared to all other countries with the 
same level of rating but that have not been downgraded recently. We also include horizons 
up to one year to assess how long this penalty lasts. 
We report in Table 12 the results for the estimation of equation (9). Countries that have 
been downgraded within a month have half of a percentage point higher yield spreads, 
compared with other countries with similar rating. This effect is present up until 6 months 
after the downgrade and it disappears afterwards. For the rating upgrades, the effect is 
symmetric on the sign but asymmetric on the magnitude. After an upgrade, countries 
benefit of lower yields of around 0.1 percentage points, relative to countries with a similar 
rating. 
[Table 12] 
 
The results for the CDS go in the same direction. Controlling for the level of rating, a 
country that has been downgraded less than 6 months ago, faces around 100 basis points 
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higher CDS spreads. On the other hand, if the country has been upgraded it benefits from 
lower spreads (around 44 basis points) for at least one year. 
In Appendix 1 we show the results disaggregated by rating agency. In general, they are 
in line with the aggregate results. Perhaps the most interesting finding is the stronger 
response of financial markets to announcements by Moody’s. After a downgrade, the yield 
spread is around 1.5 percentage points higher for six months (150 to 200 basis points for 
the CDS). Since Moody’s has fewer announcements than S&P and Fitch (as we mentioned 
before in section three) financial markets seem to respond more when such less frequent 
announcements take place.13 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have assessed to what extent sovereign credit rating announcements 
impinge on the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and CDS, a more liquid market, for 
the EU countries. Therefore, we have carried out an event study analysis for a panel of EU 
sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads with daily data from January 1995 until October 
2010. The so-called events are the sovereign credit rating announcements and the changes 
in the credit rating outlook from the three major rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch). 
Our main results can be summarised as follows: i) we find a significant response of 
government rating bond yield spreads to changes in both the credit rating notations and in 
the outlook (with some differences across rating agency); ii) the response results are 
particularly important for the case of negative announcements, while the reaction of 
spreads to positive rating events is more mitigated; iii) sovereign yield spreads respond 
negatively (and weakly) to positive events in the EMU countries, but not in the non-EMU 
country sub-sample, while the response to negative events is this case is quantitatively 
similar across country-sub-sample; iv) the reaction of CDS spreads to negative rating 
events has increased after the 15th of September 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy; v) 
rating and outlook announcements are essentially not anticipated in the previous 1 or 2 
months but; vi) there is evidence of bi-directional causality between sovereign ratings and 
spreads in a 1-2 week window; vii) we find evidence of rating announcement spillover 
effects, particularly from lower rated countries to higher rated countries; viii) finally, 
countries that have been downgraded less than 6 months ago face higher spreads than 
                                                          
13
 Regarding the upgrades, the negative effect on yields is only visible for Fitch. For S&P and Moody's the 
effect is actually positive, but with a small magnitude. 
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countries with the same rating but that have not been downgraded within the last six 
months implying a persistence effect.  
The abovementioned conclusions shed some additional light on the behaviour of 
capital markets vis-à-vis sovereign credit rating developments. The fact that negative rating 
events take markets mostly by surprise, can either imply that fundamentals are not fully 
discounted on a more permanent basis by markets participants or that rating events have, to 
some extent, gone astray of such underpinnings in some events. On the other hand, our 
analysis also shows that the reaction of EU spreads to credit rating events is clear and 
quick (within one to two days), which implies that good macroeconomic fundamentals and 
sound fiscal positions are key to prevent, first, rating downgrades, and then, the upward 
movement in yields and spreads. Finally, the existence of an asymmetric responsiveness of 
sovereign spreads vis-à-vis rating developments may also impinge importantly in 
economic and financial outcomes, with implications for policymaking.  
Finally, we have addressed a very particular question on how rating announcements 
received by the financial markets. One question that we do not address it to what extent are 
rating announcements based on fundamentals or whether some of them can be exogenous 
(for instance, a mistake by an agency). The reaction of the market might be very different 
in these two cases. In our framework, we are not isolating the effect of a truly exogenous 
shock to ratings, but we capture the two effects simultaneously. Distinguishing between the 
two channels would be a future valuable, although difficult contribution. 
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Figure 1 – Yield spreads before and after an announcement 
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Note: based on 73 upgrades, 31 downgrades, 37 positive outlook and 28 negative outlook announcements for 
the 3 agencies. The number of days is in the horizontal axis. 
 
Figure 2 – CDS spreads before and after an announcement 
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Note: based on 36 upgrades, 63 downgrades, 23 positive outlook and 44 negative outlook announcements for 
the 3 agencies. The number of days is in the horizontal axis. 
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Table 1 – S&P, Moody’s and Fitch rating systems 
Characterization of debt 
and issuer (source: 
Moody’s) 
 Rating Linear 
transformation 
  S&P Moody’s  Fitch  
Highest quality 
In
v
es
tm
en
t g
ra
de
 
AAA Aaa AAA 17 
High quality 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16 
AA Aa2 AA 15 
AA- Aa3 AA- 14 
Strong payment capacity 
A+ A1 A+ 13 
A A2 A 12 
A- A3 A- 11 
Adequate payment 
capacity 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10 
BBB Baa2 BBB 9 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 8 
Likely to fulfil 
obligations, ongoing 
uncertainty 
Sp
ec
u
la
tiv
e 
gr
ad
e 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7 
BB Ba2 BB 6 
BB- Ba3 BB- 5 
High credit risk 
B+ B1 B+ 4 
B B2 B 3 
B- B3 B- 2 
Very high credit risk 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+  
 
 
 
1 
 
CCC Caa2 CCC 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 
Near default with 
possibility of recovery 
CC Ca CC 
  C 
Default 
SD C DDD 
D  DD 
  D 
  
 
Table 2 – Average sovereign yield and CDS spreads 
Rating Average yield spread over Germany (%) Average CDS spread over Germany (bp) 
 S&P Moody’s Fitch S&P Moody’s Fitch 
AAA 0.18 0.21 0.19 11.1 15.0 12.9 
AA+ 0.34 0.42 0.51 25.0 30.5 45.2 
AA 0.58 0.57 0.31 49.2 35.3 17.3 
AA- 1.09 0.63 1.09 17.7 9.5 72.1 
A+ 0.95 1.35 1.05 49.9 38.3 53.6 
A 0.83 1.92 0.76 55.3 84.1 33.1 
A- 1.76 2.10 2.15 60.8 149.5 69.8 
BBB+ 2.75 3.70 2.71 96.8 302.8 102.5 
BBB 4.06 5.84 3.14 246.8 - 164.7 
BBB- 5.05 2.39 4.59 144.7 225.6 248.1 
<BB+ 3.79 3.63 2.49 371.7 107.0 373.5 
Note: Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; CDS in basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics 
reported in brackets. For some brackets just a few observations exist, for instance, for the CDS in category 
<BB+ (Moody’s) there were only 3 countries: Greece (78 days, CDS 834bp); Bulgaria (385 days, CDS 39bp) 
and Romania (542 days, CDS 50bp). 
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Table 3 – Spread changes of event countries during rating events- Full sample 
Spread Rating 
agency 
Negative events Positive events 
  [-1,1] [-1,0] [0,1] [-1,1] [-1,0] [0,1] 
Yields S&P 0.115*** 
(4.07) 
0.034 
(1.29) 
0.082** 
(2.62) 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
-0.007 
(-1.04) 
0.005 
(0.55) 
 Moody’ s 0.117 
(1.38) 
0.091 
(1.58) 
0.026 
(0.44) 
-0.027 
(-1.59) 
0.002 
(0.13) 
-0.030* 
(-1.71) 
 Fitch 0.002 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.029 
(0.99) 
0.006 
(0.52) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.010 
(0.88) 
 All 0.081** 
(2.23) 
0.036 
(1.14) 
0.054** 
(2.51) 
-0.007 
(-0.92) 
-0.004 
(-0.56) 
-0.004 
(-0.51) 
CDS S&P 5.842 
(0.95) 
7.486 
(1.34) 
-1.64 
(-0.57) 
-1.94* 
(-1.92) 
-1.019 
(-1.73) 
-0.73 
(-0.78) 
 Moody’ s 23.633*** 
(2.79) 
10.142 
(1.53) 
13.491* 
(1.88) 
0.727 
(0.78) 
-0.283 
(-0.56) 
-0.055 
(-0.16) 
 Fitch 13.768** 
(2.11) 
10.735*** 
(2.62) 
3.033 
(0.81) 
-0.145 
(-0.15) 
0.034 
(0.06) 
-0.179 
(-0.45) 
 All 12.523*** 
(3.12) 
9.629*** 
(2.93) 
3.254 
(1.34) 
-0.872* 
(-1.62) 
-0.524 
(-1.56) 
-0.347 
(-0.91) 
Note: Positive (negative) events refer to upgrades (downgrades) of the letter credit rating or upward 
(downward) revisions in the sovereign’s credit outlook.  Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; CDS 
in basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets. ***,**,* means significance at 1%, 5%, 
10%, respectively.  For instance, [-1,1] means the change of the spread between t-1 and t+1. 
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Table 4 – Spread changes of event countries during rating events, full sample 
  Negative events Positive events 
Spread Rating 
agency 
Rating downgrades Rating upgrades 
  [-1,1] [-1,0] [0,1] [-1,1] [-1,0] [0,1] 
Yields S&P 0.114*** 
(4.09) 
0.054*** 
(4.57) 
0.061** 
(2.64) 
0.017 
(1.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.017 
(1.55) 
 Moody’ s 0.117 
(1.21) 
0.084 
(1.40) 
0.033 
(0.74) 
-0.033** 
(-2.16) 
-0.016** 
(-2.28) 
-0.017 
(-1.11) 
 Fitch 0.107** 
(2.49) 
0.115* 
(1.81) 
0.046 
(1.30) 
0.005 
(0.15) 
0.026 
(1.39) 
-0.022 
(-1.15) 
 All 0.112*** 
(4.314) 
0.080*** 
(3.29) 
0.050*** 
(2.87) 
-0.003 
(-0.27) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
-0.005 
(-0.58) 
CDS S&P 6.170*** 
(3.70) 
6.922** 
(2.11) 
-0.753 
(-0.25) 
-0.153 
(-0.33) 
-1.019 
(-1.73) 
0.867*** 
(3.20) 
 Moody’ s 19.889** 
(2.60) 
4.234 
(1.71) 
15.654* 
(2.18) 
0.726 
(0.79) 
0.541 
(0.93) 
0.186 
(0.34) 
 Fitch 12.437 
(1.24) 
10.756 
(1.27) 
1.681 
(0.80) 
3.010 
(0.92) 
2.000 
(0.95) 
1.010 
(0.83) 
 All 11.255*** 
(2.80) 
7.767*** 
(2.30) 
3.489 
(1.56) 
0.917 
(1.12) 
0.315 
(0.55) 
0.602 
(1.69) 
Spread Rating 
agency 
Negative outlook revisions Positive outlook revisions 
  [-1,1] [-1,0] [0,1] [-1,1] [-1,0] [0,1] 
Yields S&P 0.117** 
(2.40) 
0.016 
(0.32) 
0.101 
(1.80)* 
-0.016 
(-0.80) 
-0.013 
(-1.16) 
-0.003 
(-0.23) 
 Moody’ s 0.174 
(1.29) 
0.130 
(1.43) 
0.043 
(0.46) 
-0.024 
(-0.91) 
0.013 
(0.51) 
-0.037 
(-1.41) 
 Fitch -0.087 
(-0.55) 
-0.101 
(-0.72) 
0.014 
(0.32) 
0.006 
(0.63) 
-0.017 
(-1.47) 
0.023 
(1.62) 
 All 0.068 
(1.06) 
0.007 
(0.12) 
0.062 
(1.67)* 
-0.010 
(-0.91) 
-0.007 
(-0.71) 
-0.003 
(-0.29) 
CDS S&P 5.620 
(0.55) 
7.869 
(0.86) 
-2.249 
(-0.50) 
-2.967* 
(-1.95) 
-1.332 
(-1.52) 
-1.635 
(-1.16) 
 Moody’ s 26.084** 
(2.11) 
14.164 
(1.41) 
11.920 
(1.16) 
-1.853** 
(-2.95) 
-1.053 
(-1.39) 
-0.800 
(-1.63) 
 Fitch 14.735 
(1.68)* 
10.719*** 
(2.88) 
4.016 
(0.63) 
-1.197** 
(-2.08) 
-0.621* 
(-1.71) 
-0.576* 
(-1.80) 
 All 13.616** 
(2.22) 
10.427** 
(2.18) 
3.189 
(0.84) 
-
2.009*** 
(-3.17) 
-
0.984*** 
(-2.52) 
-1.025* 
(-1.85) 
Note: Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets. Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; 
CDS in basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets.  ***,**,* means significance at 1%, 
5%, 10%, respectively. For instance, [-1,1] means the change of the spread between t-1 and t+1. 
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Table 5 – Spread changes of event countries during rating events- period [-1, 1] 
Spread Rating 
agency 
Negative events Positive events 
  Full EMU Non-
EMU 
Full EMU Non-
EMU 
Yields S&P 0.115*** 
(4.07) 
0.104*** 
(3.76) 
0.127*** 
(3.99) 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
0.023 
(0.90) 
0.012 
(0.59) 
 Moody’ s 0.117 
(1.38) 
0.125 
(1.50) 
0.084 
(1.07) 
-0.027 
(-1.59) 
-
0.035*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.021 
(-0.88) 
 Fitch 0.002 
(0.02) 
0.054 
(1.09) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
0.006 
(0.52) 
-0.022 
(-1.67) 
0.027 
(0.46) 
 All 0.081** 
(2.23) 
0.094*** 
(3.40) 
0.079* 
(1.65) 
-0.007 
(-0.92) 
-0.011 
(-1.62)* 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
CDS S&P 5.842 
(0.95) 
8.011*** 
(3.246) 
3.862 
(0.46) 
-1.94* 
(-1.92) 
-0.127 
(-0.43) 
-2.637* 
(-1.94) 
 Moody’ s 23.633 
(2.79)*** 
24.101*** 
(2.69) 
21.059** 
(2.24) 
0.727 
(0.78) 
0.381 
(0.52) 
-0.245 
(-0.30) 
 Fitch 13.768** 
(2.11) 
6.590 
(0.89) 
19.221** 
(2.48) 
-0.145 
(-0.15) 
0.996 
(0.71) 
0.015 
(0.01) 
 All 12.523*** 
(3.12) 
11.142*** 
(3.23) 
13.100*** 
(2.62) 
-0.872 
(-1.62)* 
0.388 
(0.78) 
-1.057 
(-1.44) 
Note: Positive (negative) events refer to upgrades (downgrades) of the letter credit rating or upward 
(downward) revisions in the sovereign’s credit outlook. Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; CDS 
in basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets. Mean with associated t-statistics 
reported in brackets. ***,**,* means significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. [-1,1] means the change of 
the spread between t-1 and t+1. 
 
 
Table 6 – Regression spread changes of event countries during rating events, full sample 
Spread Rating 
agency 
Negative events Positive events 
  [-1,1] [-1,0] [0,1] [-1,1] [-1,0] [0,1] 
Yields S&P 0.112*** 
(3.87) 
0.055* 
(1.78) 
0.098*** 
(3.32) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.007 
(-0.83) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
 Moody’ s 0.111 
(1.67)* 
0.102** 
(2.25) 
0.069 
(1.26) 
-0.027 
(-1.83)* 
-0.008 
(-0.99) 
-0.029 
(-1.86)* 
 Fitch -0.001 
(-0.0) 
0.036 
(2.72)*** 
0.016 
(0.26) 
0.006 
(0.64) 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
0.008 
(0.75) 
 All 0.077* 
(1.83) 
0.059*** 
(3.32) 
0.067** 
(2.36) 
-0.007 
(-1.22) 
-0.006 
(-2.13)** 
-0.006 
(-1.15) 
CDS S&P -0.664 
(-0.23) 
6.791* 
(1.88) 
-2.979 
(-1.50) 
-0.851* 
(-1.71) 
-1.148*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.586 
(-0.60) 
 Moody’ s 14.892** 
(2.29) 
9.225 
(1.51) 
11.779** 
(2.13) 
-0.240 
(-0.73) 
-0.354** 
(-2.40) 
-0.085 
(-0.33) 
 Fitch 5.129 
(1.02) 
9.966** 
(2.29) 
1.213 
(0.38) 
0.019 
(0.06) 
0.044 
(0.07) 
-0.239 
(-1.11) 
 All 4.765** 
(2.20) 
8.541*** 
(3.06) 
1.672 
(1.01) 
-0.381 
(-1.17) 
-0.517 
(-1.58) 
-0.325 
(-0.84) 
Note: Positive (negative) events refer to upgrades (downgrades) of the letter credit rating or upward 
(downward) revisions in the sovereign’s credit outlook. Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; CDS in 
basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets. T-statistics reported in brackets. ***,**,* 
means significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. For instance, [-1,1] means the change of the spread between 
t-1 and t+1. 
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Table 7 – Regression spread changes of event countries during rating events, full sample 
Spread Rating 
agency 
Negative events Positive events 
  Overall 
Period 
Before 15 
Sept 2008 
After 15 
Sept 2008 
Overall 
Period 
Before 15 
Sept 2008 
After 15 
Sept 2008 
Yields ALL 0.077* 
(1.83) 
0.054* 
(1.81) 
0.049 
(1.10) 
-0.007 
(-1.22) 
-0.007 
(-1.21) 
0.004 
(0.11) 
CDS ALL 4.765** 
(2.20) 
0.235 
(0.45) 
5.732* 
(1.96) 
-0.381 
(-1.17) 
-1.025** 
(-2.28) 
0.780 
(0.23) 
Note: Positive (negative) events refer to upgrades (downgrades) of the letter credit rating or upward 
(downward) revisions in the sovereign’s credit outlook. Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; CDS 
in basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets. T-statistics reported in brackets. 
***,**,* means significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection 
on 15 September 2008. 
 
 
Table 8 – Regression of spread changes against dummy during rating events, anticipation 
effects, S&P 
 Negative events Positive events 
Spread Rating downgrades Rating upgrades 
 [-30,-1] [-60,-1] [-30,-1] [-60,-1] 
Yields 0.023 
(0.41) 
0.048 
(0.61) 
-0.018 
(-0.75) 
-0.10 
(-0.51) 
CDS 7.107 
(1.81) 
4.854 * 
(1.96) 
-0.399 
(-0.83) 
-0.493 
(-0.42) 
 Negative outlook revisions Positive outlook revisions 
 [-30,-1] [-60,-1] [-30,-1] [-60,-1] 
Yields 0.184 
(1.11) 
0.200 
(1.79)  
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
0.029 
(0.74) 
CDS 1.108 
(0.20) 
1.960 
(0.42) 
-0.302 
(-0.19) 
-0.245 
(-0.13) 
Note: Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; CDS in basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics 
reported in brackets. T-statistics reported in the table. ***,**, *  means significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, 
respectively. For instance, [-30,-1] is the change of the spread between t-30 and t-1. 
 
Table 9 –Granger Causality Tests 
Rating Yield spread Stock Market Return 
Yield does not 
cause Rating 
LR= 46.44 
(0.000) 
Rating does not 
cause Yield 
LR= 
300.59 
(0.000) 
Yield does not 
cause Stock 
market 
LR= 222.2 
(0.000) 
Stock market 
does not cause 
Rating 
LR= 13.17 
(0.022) 
Stock market 
does not cause 
Yield 
LR= 
118.04 
(0.000) 
Rating does not 
cause Stock 
market 
LR= 2.67  
(0.750) 
Rating CDS spread Stock Market Return 
CDS does not 
cause Rating 
LR= 91.62 
(0.000) 
Rating does not 
cause CDS 
LR= 99.71 
(0.000) 
CDS does not 
cause Stock 
market 
LR= 206.17 
(0.000) 
Stock market 
does not cause 
Rating 
LR= 19.30 
(0.002) 
Stock market 
does not cause 
CDS 
LR= 14.85 
(0.011) 
Rating does not 
cause Stock 
market 
LR= 14.87 
(0.000) 
Note: Equations (4), (5) and (6) are estimated with country fixed effects. We use 5 lags of all variables. p-
value of the test is reported in brackets. We should compare the test statistics with a Chi square with 5 
degrees of freedom. 
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Table 10 – Contagion: effect on spreads of non-event countries 
Coefficient Country FE Country FE +time trend Country FE+ Time FE 
 Yields 
(β) Change in 
rating in event 
countries 
-0.064 
(-1.91)** 
-0.020 
(-0.54) 
-0.100 
(-3.23)*** 
-0.065 
(-1.92)* 
-0.100 
(-1.77)* 
0.273 
(0.83) 
(δ) Rating 
differences 
- 0.000 
(0.02) 
- -0.009 
(-0.11) 
- -0.033 
(-0.66) 
(γ) Interaction - -0.011 
(-2.41)** 
- -0.008 
(-1.74)* 
- -0.025 
(-2.13)** 
 CDS 
(β) Change in 
rating in event 
countries 
-0.2245 
(-1.83)* 
-0.060 
(-0.83) 
-0.138 
(-1.43) 
0.037 
(0.31) 
-0.123 
(-0.48) 
0.378 
(1.02) 
(δ) Rating 
differences 
- -0.013 
(0.02) 
- -0.007 
(-0.22) 
- -0.048 
(-0.83) 
(γ) Interaction - -0.088 
(-1.58) 
- -0.086 
(-1.58) 
- -0.072 
(-1.52) 
Note: Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; CDS in basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics 
reported in brackets. T-statistics reported in the table. ***,**, *  means significance at 1%, 5%, 10% 
respectively. FE – fixed effects. 
 
Table 11 – Contagion: effect on spreads of non-event countries, EMU vs. non-EMU 
(country FE) 
Coefficient Overall EMU non-EMU 
  Yields  
(β) Change in rating 
in event countries 
-0.064 
(-1.91)** 
-0.064 
(-2.35)** 
-0.064 
(-0.75) 
  CDS  
(β) Change in rating 
in event countries 
-0.2245 
(-1.83)* 
-0.382 
(-1.92)** 
-0.053 
(-0.38) 
Note: Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; T-statistics reported in the table. ***,**, *  means 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. FE – fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 12: Persistent effects of rating changes at different horizons 
Coefficient Yields Spreads CDS Spreads 
(β) Rating -1.233 (-68.87)*** -195.15 (-79.16)*** 
(γ) Rating2 0.022 (33.15)*** 5.86 (50.95)*** 
(δ) Downgrade     
<1 month 0.454 (17.46)*** 113.7 (49.74)*** 
1-3 months 0.576 (28.09)*** 111.7 (59.68)*** 
3-6 months 0.475 (25.90)*** 75.3 (43.79)*** 
6-12 months 0.040 (2.71)*** -4.2 (-2.74)*** 
(θ) Upgrade     
<1 month -0.093 (-5.38)*** -43.1 (-16.51)*** 
1-3 months -0.110 (-8.59)*** -49.0 (-24.85)*** 
3-6 months -0.118 (-10.91)*** -38.6 (-22.52)*** 
6-12 months -0.072 (-8.59)*** -45.1 (-32.94)*** 
Note: Equation (9) is estimated with country fixed effects with 65288 observations for the yield spreads and 
35097 observations for the CDS spreads. Yields spreads are expressed in decimal points; CDS in basis points. 
Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets. ***,**,* means significance at 1%,5%, 10%, 
respectively.  
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Data annex 
 
Daily sovereign yield data come from Reuters. The respective tickers are: BE10YT_RR, 
DE10YT_RR, IE10YT_RR, GR10YT_RR, ES10YT_RR, FR10YT_RR, IT10YT_RR, NL10YT_RR, 
AT10YT_RR, PT10YT_RR, FI10YT_RR, MT10YT_RR, SI10YT_RR, SK10YT_RR, DK10YT_RR, 
GB10YT_RR, BG10YT_RR, CZ10YT_RR, HU10YT_RR, LT10YT_RR, LV10YT_RR, PL10YT_RR, 
RO10YT_RR, SE10YT_RR. 
 
Daily 5-year Credit default swaps spreads, historical close, are provided by 
DataStream. 
 
Daily equity indexes are provided by Datastream:  
 
Germany - Equity/index - DAX 30 Performance Index - Historical close - Euro 
France - Equity/index - France CAC 40 Index - Historical close - Euro 
Athens Stock Exchange ATHEX Composite Index - Historical close - Euro 
Standard & Poors/MIB Index - historic close - Euro 
Portugal PSI-20 Index -  historic close - Euro 
Amsterdam Exchange (AEX) Index - historic close - Euro 
Spain IBEX 35 Index - historic close - Euro 
Belgium BEL 20 Index - historic close - Euro 
Ireland Stock Exchange Overall (ISEQ) Index - historic close - Euro 
Nordic Exchange OMX Helsinki (OMXH) Index - historic close - Euro 
Austrian Traded Index (ATX) - Percentage change in the latest trade price or value from the historic close - 
Euro 
Slovenian Stock Exchange (SBI) Index - Percentage change in the latest trade price or value from the historic 
close - Euro 
Cyprus Stock Exchange General Index - Historical close - Euro 
Malta Stock Exchange Index - Percentage change in the latest trade price or value from the historic close - 
Maltese lira 
Slovakia SAX 16 Index - Percentage change in the latest trade price or value from the historic close - Euro 
Bulgaria Stock Exchange SOFIX Index - Historical close, end of period - Bulgarian lev, provided by 
Bloomberg  
Prague PX 50 Index - Historical close, end of period - Czech koruna 
Nordic Exchange OMX Copenhagen (OMXC) 20 Index - Historical close, end of period - Danish krone 
Nordic Exchange OMX Tallinn (OMXT) Index - Historical close, end of period - Estonian kroon 
Nordic Exchange OMX Riga (OMXR) Index - Historical close, end of period - Latvian lats 
Nordic Exchange OMX Vilnius (OMXV) Index - Historical close, end of period - Lithuanian litas 
Budapest Stock Exchange BUX Index - Historical close, end of period - Hungarian forint 
Warsaw Stock Exchange General Index - Historical close, end of period - Polish zloty 
Romania BET Composite Index (Local Currency) - Historical close, end of period - Romanian leu 
Nordic Exchange OMX Stockholm 30 (OMXS30) Index - Historical close, end of period - Swedish krona 
Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index - Historical close, end of period - UK pound sterling 
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Appendix 1: additional results 
 
Table A1.1 – Summary of rating announcements 
 
 
Announcements since 1995 Starting date and 
total announcements captured 
Country Upgrade Downgrade Positive Outlook 
Negative 
Outlook Yields CDS Equity 
Euro Area 
       
Austria 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0)  2 Jan 1995 (0) 
6 Jan 2004 
(0) 
1 Jan 2002 
(0) 
Belgium 2 (0,0,2) 1 (0,0,1) 1 (1,0,1) 0 (0,0,0) 10 May 1996 (4) 
5 Jan 2004 
(2) 
1 Jan 2002 
(3) 
Finland 8 (3,2,3) 0 (0,0,0) 3 (3,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 2 Jan 1995 (11) 
14 May 
2008 (0) 
1 Jan 2002 
(1) 
France 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 
28 May 
1996 
(0) 
16 Aug 
2005 (0) 
1 Jan 2002 
(0) 
Germany 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 2 Jan 1995  (0) 
8 Jan 2004 
(0) 
1 Jan 2002 
(0) 
Greece 12 (4,3,5) 11 (4,3,4) 7 (1,2,4) 6 (3,1,2) 2 Nov 1998 (33) 
9 Jan 2004 
(19) 
1 Jan 2002 
(23) 
Ireland 6 (3,3,1) 7 (3,2,2) 1 (1,0,0) 3 (1,1,1) 2 Jan 1995  (17) 
11 Aug 
2003 (10) 
1 Jan 2002 
(10) 
Italy 3 (0,2,1) 3 (2,0,2) 1 (0,1,0) 4 (3,0,1) 12 Jun 1996 (9) 
20 Jan 2004 
(4) 
1 Jan 2002 
(7) 
Malta 4 (1,2,1) 2 (1,1,0) 2 (0,1,1) 3 (1,2,0) 4 Aug 1998 (3) - 
3 Jan 2002 
(5) 
Netherlands 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 8 May 1996 (0) 
7 Sep 2005 
(0) 
1 Jan 2002 
(0) 
Portugal 4 (1,2,1) 5 (3,1,1) 1 (1,0,0) 6 (3,1,2) 2 Jan 1995  (16) 
26 Jan 2004 
(11) 
1 Jan 2002 
(11) 
Slovakia 18 (8,4,6) 2 (1,0,1) 9 (2,4,3) 3 (1,1,1) 17 Mar 2004 (9) 
6 Jan 2004 
(14) 
1 Jan 2002 
(20) 
Slovenia 10 (3,3,4) 0 (0,0,0) 6 (1,3,2) 0 (0,0,0) - 1 Jan 2003 (6) 
1 Jan 2002 
(13) 
Spain 5 (2,1,2) 4 (2,1,1) 3(2,1,0) 3 (2,1,0) 3 Jul 1996 (15) 
27 Apr 2005 
(7) 
1 Jan 2002 
(10) 
Non-euro area        
Bulgaria 17 (7,5,5) 2 (1,0,1) 5 (1,3,1) 3 (1,0,2) 3 Sep 2002 (12) 
8 Sep 2004 
(12) 
2 Jan 2002 
(21) 
Czech Republic 7 (2,2,3) 2 (1,0,1) 4 (2,1,1) 0 (0,0,0) 14 Apr 2000 (9) 
8 Sep 2004 
(7) 
1 Jan 2002 
(9) 
Denmark 3 (1,1,1) 0 (0,0,0) 3 (1,1,1) 0 (0,0,0) 2 Jan 1995 (6) 
22 Mar 2006 
(0) 
1 Jan 2002 
(1) 
Estonia 8 (3,1,4) 3 (1,0,2) 8 (3,1,4) 3 (1,1,1) - 8 Feb 2006 (10) 
1 Jan 2002 
(16) 
Hungary 10 (4,3,3) 8 (3,3,2) 4 (1,1,2) 10 (4,2,4) 8 Jun 1999 (26) 
8 Sep 2004 
(16) 
1 Jan 2002 
(18) 
Latvia 5 (2,1,2) 12 (5,3,4) 5 (2,1,2) 4 (1,1,2) - 13 Jan 2006 (17) 
1 Jan 2002 
(24) 
Lithuania 13 (4,4,5) 8 (3,2,3) 6 (2,3,2) 3 (1,1,1) - 6 Jun 2005 (14) 
1 Jan 2002 
(27) 
Poland 9 (4,2,3) 0 (0,0,0) 8 (4,1,3) 1 (1,0,0) 3 Aug 1999 (11) 
8 Sep 2004 
(5) 
1 Jan 2002 
(8) 
Romania 16 (6,4,6) 8 (3,2,3) 8 (3,2,3) 5 (2,1,2) - 8 Sep 2004 (13) 
1 Jan 2002 
(22) 
Sweden 7 (1,3,3) 1(0,1,0) 3 (1,1,1) 2 (1,1,0) 1 Jan 1999 (9) 
21 Nov 
2007 (0) 
1 Jan 2002 
(4) 
United Kingdom 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0) 1 (1,0,0) 27 Set 1996 (1) 
8 Sep 2004 
(1) 
1 Jan 2002 
(1) 
Euro area, total 72 (25,21,26) 35 (16,8,12) 
34 
(11,13,10) 
28  
(14,7,7) 117 73 102 
Non-euro area, 
total 
95 
(34,26,35) 
44 
(17,11,16) 
54 
(20,15,20) 32 (13,7,12) 74 94 150 
Total  167 (59,47,61) 
79 
(33,19,28) 
88 
(31,28,30) 
60 
(27,14,19) 191 167 252 
Note: the announcements since 1995 include in brackets the number for each agency (S&P, Moody´s, Fitch). For 
instance, Greece 12 (4,3,5) in the upgrade column means: 4, 3, and 5 upgrades respectively from S&P, Moody´s, 
and Fitch. 
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Table A1.2 – Granger causality tests, specific agency regressions 
 
 
 5 Lags 10 Lags 
Yield spread is not caused S&P  LR=482.65 (0.000) LR=2023.28 (0.000) 
by Moody´s  LR=85.33 (0.000) LR=108.02 (0.000) 
 Fitch  LR=27.31 (0.000) LR=68.33 (0.000) 
 Stock Returns   LR=112.80 (0.000)  LR=116.77 (0.000)  
S&P is not caused by Moody´s LR=201.62 ( 0.000) LR=242.97 ( 0.000) 
 Fitch LR=7.79 (0.168) LR=45.99 (0.000) 
 Stock Returns   LR=12.34 (0.031) LR=17.22 (0.070) 
 Yield spread LR=106.22 (0.000) LR=251.50 (0.000) 
Moody’s is not caused by S&P LR=38.40 (0.000) LR=51.00  (0.000) 
 Fitch LR= 0.20 (0.999) LR= 160.83  (0.000) 
 Stock Returns   LR=19.65 (0.002) LR=24.18 (0.001) 
 Yield spread LR=27.35 (0.000) LR=44.83 (0.000) 
Fitch is not caused by S&P LR=23.37 (0.003) LR=104.55 (0.000) 
 Moody´s LR=16.85 (0.005) LR=1.25 (0.999) 
 Stock Returns   LR=6.95 (0.224) LR=14.59 (0.148) 
 Yield spread LR=6.21 (0.287) LR=4.79 (0.905) 
Stock returns are not caused S&P LR=14.99 (0.010) LR=104.55 (0.000) 
by Moody´s LR=6.42 (0.2678) LR=1.25 (0.999) 
 Fitch LR= 6.91 (0.228) LR14.59 (0.148) 
 Yield spread LR=9.59 (0.088) LR=4.79 (0.905) 
Note: Each equation is estimated individually with country fixed effects and includes all variables in lag-
differences. We use either 5 or 10 lags of all variables. The p-value of the test is reported in brackets. We 
should compare the test statistics with a Chi square with 5 and 10 degrees of freedom respectively. The 
specific rating variable per agency is now, for instance for Moody’s, 0.5 0.5it it it itR M posM negM= + − . 
 
 
Table A1.3: Persistent effects of rating changes on yield spreads at different horizons, by 
rating agency 
 
Coefficient S&P Moody’s Fitch 
(β) Rating -1.035 (-63.45)*** -0.403 (-26.34)*** -1.413 (-77.90)*** 
(γ) Rating2 0.021 (34.34)*** -0.004 (-7.39)*** 0.037 (55.16)*** 
(δ) Downgrade       
<1 month 0.315 (8.82)*** 1.241 (26.60)*** 0.291 (6.90)*** 
1-3 months 0.500 (19.08)*** 1.542 (43.87)*** 0.445 (14.60)*** 
3-6 months 0.477 (21.22)*** 1.534 (45.23)*** 0.987 (37.85)*** 
6-12 months -0.056 (-3.12)*** 0.399 (14.79)*** 0.652 (30.02)*** 
(θ) Upgrade       
<1 month 0.192 (6.26)*** 0.045 (1.49) 0.001 (0.02) 
1-3 months 0.081 (3.81)*** 0.048 (2.28)** -0.098 (-4.85)*** 
3-6 months 0.136 (7.68)*** -0.002 (-0.12) -0.208 (-12.45)*** 
6-12 months 0.129 (10.08)*** -0.149 (-12.09)*** -0.105 (-8.69)*** 
Note: Equation (9) is estimated with country fixed effects using 65288 observations. Yields spreads are 
expressed in decimal points. Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets. ***,**,* means significance 
at 1%,5%, 10%, respectively.  
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Table A1.4: Persistent effects of rating changes on CDS spreads at different horizons, by 
rating agency 
 
Coefficient S&P Moody’s Fitch 
(β) Rating -172.82 (-99.34)*** -70.64 (-26.18)*** -192.32 (-105.89)*** 
(γ) Rating2 5.04 (66.18)*** 0.83 (7.08)*** 6.39 (76.39)*** 
(δ) Downgrade       
<1 month 97.51 (31.51)*** 158.08 (32.69)*** 142.08 (44.93)*** 
1-3 months 85.31 (36.69)*** 199.14 (54.46)*** 155.16 (65.96)*** 
3-6 months 70.27 (34.75)*** 133.77 (37.89)*** 155.76 (75.80)*** 
6-12 months -2.42 (-1.45) -15.63 (-4.84)*** 26.65 (14.42)*** 
(θ) Upgrade       
<1 month -32.45 (-7.80)*** -88.15 (-14.05)*** -25.94 (-6.91)*** 
1-3 months -39.40 (-13.20)*** -87.99 (-19.55)*** -30.76 (-11.73)*** 
3-6 months -50.89 (-20.70)*** -87.00 (-23.16)*** -30.43 (-13.83)*** 
6-12 months -41.23 (-23.51)*** -98.26 (36.45)*** -27.92 (-17.71)*** 
Note: Equation (9) is estimated with country fixed effects using 35097 observations. CDS spreads are expressed 
in basis points. Mean with associated t-statistics reported in brackets. ***,**,* means significance at 1%,5%, 
10%, respectively.  
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Figure A1.1 – Sovereign yields by country 
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Figure A1.1 – Sovereign yields by country (cont) 
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Figure A1.1 – Sovereign yields by country (cont) 
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Figure A1.2 – CDS by country 
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Figure A1.2 – CDS by country (cont.) 
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Figure A1.2 – CDS by country (cont.) 
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
Cr
ed
it 
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
s
01jul2004 01jan2006 01jul2007 01jan2009 01jul2010
Date
Poland
 
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
Cr
ed
it 
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
s
01jul2004 01jan2006 01jul2007 01jan2009 01jul2010
Date
Portugal
 
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
Cr
ed
it 
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
s
01jul2004 01jan2006 01jul2007 01jan2009 01jul2010
Date
Romania
 
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
Cr
ed
it 
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
s
01jul2004 01jan2006 01jul2007 01jan2009 01jul2010
Date
Slovakia
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
Cr
ed
it 
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
s
01jan200301jan200401jan200501jan200601jan200701jan200801jan200901jan2010
Date
Slovenia
 
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
Cr
ed
it 
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
s
01jan2005 01jul2006 01jan2008 01jul2009 01jan2011
Date
Spain
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
Cr
ed
it 
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
s
01jan2008 01jul2008 01jan2009 01jul2009 01jan2010 01jul2010
Date
Sweden
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Cr
ed
it 
de
fa
u
lt 
sw
ap
s
01jan2008 01jul2008 01jan2009 01jul2009 01jan2010 01jul2010
Date
United Kingdom
 
  
 38
Figure A1.3 – Rating by country 
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Figure A1.3 – Rating by country (cont.) 
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Figure A1.3 – Rating by country (cont.) 
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Appendix 2: effects of announcements on stock market returns 
 
Figure A2.1 – Stock market returns before and after an announcement 
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Note: based on 95 upgrades, 63 downgrades, 47 positive outlook and 47 negative outlook announcements for 
the 3 agencies. 
 
 
